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The Duty to Support Minor Children Does Not
Extend to the Estate of a Deceased Parent, But
Ends at That Parent's Death: Benson ex. rel.
Patterson v. Patterson
FAMILY LAW - CHILD SUPPORT - TERMINATION - DEATH OF
OBLIGOR - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the obliga-
tion to pay child support does not survive the parent obligor's
death, such that the estate of the deceased parent owes no duty of
continued support to the decedent's minor children.
Benson ex. rel. Patterson v. Patterson, 830 A.2d 966 (Pa. 2003).
Wiley Stanley Patterson died of cancer on August 1, 1999, leav-
ing behind him two minor children, Stanley Jr. and Aaron.1 The
young boys remained in the custody of their respective mothers
both prior and subsequent to their father's death.2 Prior to his
death, the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Re-
lations Section, entered orders requiring Patterson to make
weekly payments in support of Stanley and Aaron.3 The court
then terminated these support orders upon Patterson's death, and
his estate satisfied all arrearages.4 The children's mothers filed
actions against the estate in the Orphans' Court, seeking con-
tinuation of the previously-enacted child support payments until
their children reached the age of majority!
1. Benson ex rel Patterson v. Patterson, 830 A-2d 966, 967 (Pa. 2003). Wiley Stanley
Patterson, Jr. was born on March 25, 1984, to Cheryl Benson, and Aaron Patterson was
born on September 10, 1991, to Leona Lewis. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 966. Of the five chil-
dren Patterson fathered during his lifetime, these two were born out of wedlock. Id.
2. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 966.
3. Id. Patterson never actually made these court-ordered support payments during
his lifetime. Id. He did, however, make relatively small cash bequests of $20,000 to
Stanley and $1,000 to Aaron in his will. Benson ex rel. Patterson v. Patterson, 782 A.2d
553, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). Patterson's estate at the time of his death, as noted on his
Pennsylvania Inheritance Tax Return, was valued at $1,099,534.21, the result of a $2.5
million automobile accident-related personal injury settlement he had received one year
before his death. Benson, 782 A.2d at 554.
4. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 967. Arrearage is defined as "an unpaid or overdue debt."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 83 (7th ed. 2000).
5. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 967. The children's mothers also sought an increase in the
child support payments due to Patterson's receipt of the personal injury settlement and his
death. Id. The court's resolution of the issue regarding continuation of the payments,
however, precluded it from addressing this latter issue. Id. at 970.
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The Orphans' Court dismissed the complaints, reasoning that
"there was no case law or legislative duty of support imposed on
an estate of a deceased parent to support a minor child."6 The
court relied on Garney v. Estate of Hain7 in support of this find-
ing.8 Stanley and Aaron's mothers immediately filed an appeal to
the Superior Court, which upheld the trial court's decision.9
While the mothers of Patterson's children sought to distinguish
the facts of Garney from their own case, and thereby show that the
trial court's reliance on that case was misplaced, the Superior
Court determined that no significant distinction existed and Gar-
ney indeed was controlling. ° The Superior Court also recognized
the split of authority in the case law of other jurisdictions with
regard to whether a child support order made during a parent's
lifetime creates an obligation upon his estate to continue that
support for his minor children upon the parent's death." Those
jurisdictions subscribing to the common law approach hold that
"absent either a contractual obligation or a statutory provision,
the duty to provide child support under a court order terminates
automatically upon the death of the payor parent."2
In contrast, some jurisdictions have advocated an approach
more modern than that of the common law. 3 These jurisdictions
have found that because the original purpose for which the sup-
port order was enacted - the welfare of the child - continues
past the parent's death, and because it is a "well-established prin-
ciple that a parent's duty to support a minor child is absolute," the
obligation to pay child support survives the parent's death and
must be assumed by his estate. 4 The Superior Court further ex-
pressed concern regarding the consequences that would accom-
pany the imposition of an obligation of continued support upon the
deceased parent's estate. 5 It therefore affirmed the trial court's
6. Benson, 782 A.2d at 554.
7. 653 A.2d 21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
8. Benson, 782 A.2d at 554.
9. Id. at 555.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 554-56.
12. Id. at 556. See, e.g., Pittman v. Pittman, 419 So. 2d 1376 (Ala. 1982).
13. Benson, 782 A.2d at 557.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 559. The majority stated: "Although we believe that there is merit to the
modern approach, the devil is in the details. Any restructuring of support laws, practices,
or procedures is better left to the legislature and the supreme court." Id. at 560.
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ruling while simultaneously revealing an idealistic hope that the
Supreme Court and the legislature would revisit the issue. 6
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted allocatur to de-
termine whether, in the State of Pennsylvania, the estate of a de-
ceased parent owes a duty of continued support to the decedent's
minor children when there was an existing support order in place
at the time of decedent's death, such that the Orphans' Court
erred in holding that Patterson's estate owed no such duty. 7
Justice Eakin, writing for the majority, 8 began his analysis by
evaluating the relative facts of Gamey, as had the Orphans' Court
and Superior Court. 9 While he acquiesced to the discrepancy
noted by the mothers of Patterson's children between that case
and the one before him, 0 Justice Eakin ultimately affirmed the
lower courts' decisions that Garney, which held that there was "no
statutory authority for imposing the duty of support upon the es-
tate of the decedent," was controlling.2' For, as the Superior Court
had established, the distinction between the two cases was insig-
nificant, as "a parent has a duty to support minor children even in
the absence of a court order."2
The majority then assessed the duty - or lack thereof - to sup-
port placed upon a deceased parent's estate by the actions of the
Pennsylvania legislature.23 It noted the recent trend of legislative
expansion of the duty of parents to support their children.24 But
16. Id. at 560.
17. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 967. Allocatur is defined as "denot[ing] permission to ap-
peal," as used today in Pennsylvania. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 59 (7th ed. 2000).
18. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 966. The majority included Justices Castille and Saylor. Id.
Chief Justice Cappy and Justice Nigro concurred and filed a separate opinion. Id. Former
Chief Justice Zappala did not participate in the decision. Id. at 970.
19. Id. at 967.
20. Id. In Garney, there were no support orders already in place at the time of the
father's death, as there were in this case. Id. Patterson's children argued that because of
this distinguishing factor, "an obligation of support existed in [their] case that was not
present in Garney." Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 967.
24. Id. The conditional nature of this obligation under the common law has been, in
recent years, made nearly mandatory. Id. Justice Eakin cites Gross v. Oeler, 594 A.2d 649,
651 (Pa. 1991), which forwarded the originally precatory language describing the parent's
duty under the common law. Id. In Gross, the parent's duty to support his minor child was
conditioned on the receipt of "love, affection, and assistance" from that child. Id. Recently,
however, that duty has become "well nigh absolute." Id. (citing Sutliff v. Sutliff, 489 A-2d
764, 771 (Pa. 1985)).
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while Pennsylvania has enacted extensive support legislation,25
and has "judicially enforced support guidelines," the legislature
has not gone so far as to extend that duty of support to the par-
26ents' estates.
The court noted that "no statute has directly or inferentially ex-
tended the obligation of [child] support beyond the death of the
parent."27 Justice Eakin next revisited this court's decision in Blue
v. Blue,25 in which it was determined that the court will decline to
impose a duty itself that has not been imposed by the legislature,
nor developed by the case law of Pennsylvania. 2 The court in Blue
opted instead to await the legislature's guidance, rather than cre-
ating duties and obligations by its own judicial pronouncement.
Justice Eakin pointed out that the same reasoning must be ap-
plied in Patterson.3 1
While the court was sympathetic to the continuing needs of the
minor children of deceased parents, it promulgated deference to
the legislature and was hesitant to act in a legislative capacity in
which it did not belong.32 Justice Eakin was influenced by the fact
that the legislature has not sat idly by, but has taken an active
role in creating laws relative to child support in Pennsylvania.3
Because in so creating those laws the legislature has failed to en-
act one extending the duty of support to a deceased parent's es-
tate, the judiciary has neither a right nor a duty of its own to do
34
so.
Justice Eakin concluded by acknowledging the "allure" of the
minority position that the estate of a deceased parent is obligated
to continue child support payments,3 but ultimately rested his
decision upon the historical guidance of Pennsylvania precedence
and the "soundness" that this majority position offers.36 The court
25. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 967. The Domestic Relations Code, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §
4321(2) provides: "Parents are liable for the support of their children who are unemanci-
pated and 18 years of age or younger." 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4321 (1985).
26. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 967-68.
27. Id. at 968 (citing Garney, 653 A.2d at 21).
28. 616 A.2d 628 (Pa. 1992).
29. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 968.
30. Id. (citing Blue, 616 A.2d at 632).




35. Id at 969. A number of states, including California, Montana, New Jersey, and
West Virginia, have enacted laws or found circumstances wherein the estate has a duty to
pay child support. Id.
36. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 969.
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held that in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the estate of a
deceased parent owes no duty of continued support to the dece-
dent's minor children."
Chief Justice Cappy authored a concurring opinion in which he
expressed his support of the court's decision to wait for the Gen-
eral Assembly to make a law regarding the duty of support owed
by a deceased parent's estate - and not to create one itself by ju-
dicial pronouncement - as the most prudent course of action."
Justice Newman authored a dissenting opinion in which she ad-
vocated the minority position that circumstances exist wherein the
estate of a deceased parent may be ordered to pay child support.
She asserted that the majority's reliance on Garney was improper
because that case is distinguishable from Patterson, in that no
support order existed at the time of decedent's death in Garney as
it did in Patterson." She argued that the court should not treat all
such cases indiscriminately, pooling together cases that did and
did not involve preexisting support orders, but rather, where there
is a support order already in place in the case in question, the
court should rely on a case that similarly involved such an order.41
Justice Newman next submitted that a support order is a "judi-
cially imposed obligation," such that where one already exists, it
must be enforceable against even the deceased parent's estate.42
She argued that the order should be treated the same as any other
obligation, such that the minor children who are the recipients of
that support would be able to "make a claim against the estate of
the payor as would any other creditor."3
Justice Newman also looked at the Domestic Relations Code,
and noted that while it specifically states that the obligation to
pay alimony ends at death, it does not address this issue with re-
gard to child support.45 Such an inexplicit statute, she contended,
allows for the inference that the legislature "intend[ed] for the es-
tate of parents to serve as a source of support for minor children." 6
37. Id.
38. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 970 (Cappy, C.J., concurring).
39. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
40. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
41. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 971 (Newman, J., dissenting).
43. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 971 (Newman, J., dissenting).
44. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Newman looked at § 4321(2) of
the Domestic Relations Code, supra note 25. Id.
45. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 971 (Newman, J., dissenting).
46. Id. (citing Garney, 653 A.2d at 23) (Newman, J., dissenting).
Summer 2004 909
Duquesne Law Review
Further, she submitted that the court should not sit by and await
the action of the legislature, but rather, it should actively change
the law on its own to implement this objective.47
The basic tenet that a living father is obligated to support his
minor children has long been the common law in the state of
Pennsylvania. 48  The "duty to support and maintain minor chil-
dren is universally recognized as resting upon the parents of such
children."' By statute and even in its absence, parents "are under
a legal as well as a moral duty to support, maintain, and care for
their minor children."5 ° This is a fundamental obligation, binding
the parent and continuing throughout the child's minority unless
terminated or altered by a recognized circumstance.5 It is a duty
owed not only to the minor child himself but also to society as a
whole, and ultimately "derive[d] from natural law.""
In Gross v. Oeler,53 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court identified
the source from which the duty of support originally arose.' It
stated that "[a]t common law, the duty of a parent to support his
child was conditioned upon a parent receiving love, affection and
assistance from that child."55
The nature of that parental duty to support one's minor children
today stands in marked contrast to its common law derivation.56
As early as 1835, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in In the
Matter of Harland's Accounts,57 maintained that a father is under
a legal duty to support and maintain his children.58 In 1983, the
majority in Scanlon v. Scanlon went further and eschewed that
reciprocal, symbiotic nature of the duty as espoused by the court
in Gross in favor of an interpretation that left it "well nigh abso-
lute." 9
47. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 973 (Newman, J., dissenting).
48. In the Matter of Harland's Accounts, 1835 WL 2752 (Pa. Apr. 16, 1835).
49. 59 AM. JUR. 2D Support and Maintenance of Child § 45 (2002).
50. Id.
51. 67A C.J.S. Support, Maintenance, and Education § 156 (2002).
52. Id.
53. 594 A.2d 649 (Pa. 1991).
54. Gross, 594 A.2d at 651.
55. Id.
56. Scanlon v. Scanlon, 457 A.2d 98 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
57. 1835 WL 2752 (Pa. Apr. 16, 1835).
58. In the Matter of Harland's Accounts, 1835 WL at 2752.
59. Scanlon, 457 A.2d at 102. The absolute nature of the duty was reemphasized two
years later by the court in Sutliff v. Sutliff, 489 A-2d 764 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
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In Pennsylvania, this absolute duty was codified in 1985 in sec-
tion 4321 of the Support Act."0 The relevant provision of that
statute stated that "[p]arents are liable for the support of their
children who are unemancipated and 18 years of age or younger.'
However, while the now absolute and statutorily imposed duty of
parents to support their minor children was well-established, the
nature of that same duty upon the death of the father lacked
Pennsylvania authority on point."
In 1972, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania adopted the com-
mon law of England regarding post-death child support.63 That
common law clearly held that a father's "duty to support his minor
child terminated at the father's death."' At early common law,
the father held complete control of and power over his children,
and the mother was entitled to little more than "reverence and
respect." 5 In the infrequent event of divorce, the father invariably
received custody of the children.66 The law terminating the duty of
child support at the father's death essentially allowed him to dis-
inherit his children at will, but the traditional practice of always
placing those children in the father's custody effectively negated
the danger of such disinheritance.
In the span of years from the 1 8 th century to the present time,
this practice has changed, such that children now are regularly
placed in the mother's custody." The common law that was a
comment on the times in which it was developed and upheld
thereby found itself in a new arena of changed circumstances.69
Thus, a number of jurisdictions have continued to hold that death
of the parent extinguishes the duty of support, while others have
60. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4321 (1985).
61. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4321(2) (1985).
62. Brief on Appeal of Appellants at *12, Benson ex rel Patterson v. Patterson, 2002
WL 32163554, (Pa. Feb. 25, 2002).
63. Brief on Appeal of Appellants at *12, Patterson (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1503
(1972). Section 1503(a) of the statute states the following:
The common law and such of the statutes of England as were in force in the Province
of Pennsylvania on May 14, 1776 and which were properly adapted to the circum-
stances of the inhabitants of this Commonwealth shall be deemed to have been in
force in this Commonwealth from and after February 10, 1777.
1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1503(a) (1972).
64. Brief on Appeal of Appellants at *12, Patterson.
65. Id. at *12 (citing W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 441).
66. Brief on Appeal of Appellants at *12, Patterson.
67. Id. at *12-13.
68. Id.
69. Benson, 2002 WL at *13.
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diverged from the common law and held that the duty survives
death." The courts have considered several factors in
determining the effect of the death of the obligor parent on af-
ter-accruing child support payments, including justice, or eq-
uitable considerations, sometimes concluding that in the in-
terests of justice or because of the particular equitable consid-
erations presented, a child support obligation should not ter-
minate on the death of the obligated parents, while in other
cases, the opposite conclusion was reached.71
There is a great deal of jurisprudence dealing with the issue of
the obligation of child support on the estate of a deceased parent
who has, prior to his death, contracted to support the minor
child.72 An early Pennsylvania case discussing this issue was
Stumpfs Appeal.73 In that case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
discussed whether an executory contract between the decedent
and the mother of his illegitimate child, by which the decedent
was to provide for the maintenance and support of the child, was a
continuing contract that bound the executors of his estate. 4 Jus-
tice Sterrett, writing for the majority, proffered the rule that "to
the extent of the assets that come to their hands, the personal rep-
resentatives of a decedent are responsible on all his contracts."75
Thus, the common law principle that the obligation of support
ends at death was altered when a contract was involved.76
70. 14 A.L.R. 5TH 557 (1993). In general, where post-death support obligations have
been extended to the parent's estate, certain exceptions have been made for instances
where "state statute provides otherwise, where the court decree provides for the survival of
the obligation, or where the parties have specified their intent that the obligation survive in
an underlying contract, or separation agreement, subsequently incorporated in the decree."
Id. at 557, §2(a). Where courts have held that the child support obligation survives the
obligor parent's death, they often based this decision on the idea that a court "has continu-
ing jurisdiction over such issues as support, which is not divested by the death of a party."
Id.
71. Id.
72. In re Estate of Fessman, 126 A.2d 676, 678 (1956).
73. 8 A. 866 (Pa. 1887).
74. Stumpfs, 8 A. at 866.
75. Id. at 868.
76. Id.at 869. The 1933 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case of Huffman v. Huffnan also
held that where a father contracts to support his minor child, that contract is binding on
his estate. 166 A. 570 (Pa. 1933). In Huffman, the father, in a written agreement between
himself and his separated wife, agreed to pay for the support and maintenance of his minor
children until they reached the age of majority. Id. at 571. The court agreed with Stumpfs
holding that a portion of the father's estate should be utilized to satisfy the continuing
contract he had entered into on behalf of his children. Id. at 572.
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However, the courts generally discussed such situations involv-
ing contracts as a sort of aberration of the norm to which the
common law applies. In In re Estate of Fessman," for example, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in 1956, acknowledged the principle
that "a father, in absence of a contract, has no legal obligation to
support his children after his death."78 There, the father con-
tracted with his former wife, in the form of a written letter, to pro-
vide for the support of their minor son.7'9 The majority accordingly
held the principle that a father has no legal postmortem obligation
to support his child inapplicable only because of the existence of
that contract.80
Apart from such circumstances where the father has bound
himself by contract or similar means, the majority of jurisdictions
have held that child support payments are not a continuing obli-
gation enforceable against the deceased father's estate.81
In 1957, the Supreme Court of Mississippi decided Mahaffey v.
First National Bank,82 a case in which Mrs. Mahaffey brought an
action against the estate of her deceased ex-husband for the con-
tinuation of the support payments for their minor son and daugh-
ter imposed upon him in the divorce decree.83 The court expressed
its preferred rule in terms of the negative implications that a con-
verse rule would have on the testamentary freedom and estate
planning efforts of the decedent.' The majority held that the fa-
ther's obligation to support his minor child terminated at his
death absent some liability imposed by a contract or agreement,
for "[t]o hold otherwise would seriously impede the administration
of the estates of decedents and delay the closing thereof and re-
strict the right of an individual in making disposition of his prop-
erty by will." 5
77. 126 A.2d 676, 678 (Pa. 1956).
78. Fessman, 126 A.2d at 678.
79. Id. at 677.
80. Id. By contrast, despite contrary arguments made by the children's mothers in
Patterson, the majority there disregarded the existence of the support order in place and
held that no such contractual obligation was entered into by Mr. Patterson. Patterson, 830
A.2d at 967.
81. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 968-69.
82. 97 So. 2d 756, 757 (Miss. 1957).
83. Mahaffey, 97 So. 2d at 757.




In 1960, the Kentucky Court of Appeals faced an identical issue
to that of Patterson.86 The case before the court was Bowling v.
Robinson,7 in which the mother of decedent's minor children
brought an action for continuation of support payments from de-
cedent's estate.8 The majority there further refined the extent of
the postmortem support duty and decided that:
Unless there is a provision of the judgment to the contrary,
the death of a parent who has been ordered to make payments
for the support of his child automatically terminates the obli-
gation with respect to periodic payments which would accrue
after his death, and his estate is not bound for them."
The court argued that post-mortem child support payments were
essentially self-defeating in terms of their supposed purpose - to
provide for the continued support of minor children." For by pro-
viding continued support for certain children until their majority,
the resources of the estate that may be needed, in some cases, to
support other children (from other marriages) would be depleted. 91
Thus the public policy of continued support would be frustrated,
supporting some children at the expense of others."
Twenty-two years later, the Supreme Court of Alabama came to
the same conclusion in Pittman v. Pittman.93 In that case, Mr.
Pittman had been making periodic child support payments for his
two minor daughters until he was killed in a plane crash.94 Prior
to his death, Pittman had made his daughters irrevocable benefi-
ciaries of life insurance policies to ensure their support in the
event of his untimely death.95
The majority held that the decreed provisions regarding child
support "[did] not effectuate a vested right, but merely provide[d]
periodic allowances for current and continuous support until ter-
86. 332 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Ky. 1960). This case was directly on point with Patterson, in
that in both cases there was a court ordered support order in place, there were multiple
children from different mothers, and the fathers provided for their minor children by means
of bequests in their wills. Bowling, 332 S.W.2d at 286.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 285.
89. Id. at 286-87.
90. Id. at 287.
91. Bowling, 332 S.W.2d at 287.
92. Id.
93. 419 So. 2d 1376 (Ala. 1982).
94. Pittman, 419 So. 2d at 1377.
95. Id. at 1378.
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minated."96 The father's action of making his two children the ir-
revocable beneficiaries of life insurance policies influenced the
court's decision by tending to show the parties' belief that the sup-
port payments terminated at the father's death, and therefore the
children would need some other form of support to meet their con-
tinuing needs.97
In 1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the role of
the courts vis-A-vis that of the legislature with regard to the de-
velopment and pronouncement of law in Blue v. Blue." Justice
Zappala, writing for the majority, reasoned that "[s]ince our legis-
lature has taken an active role in domestic matters through
amendments and reenactment of the Divorce Code and the Do-
mestic Relations Act, we feel the more prudent course is to await
guidance from that body rather than creating duties and obliga-
tions by judicial pronouncement."99
The majority used that reasoning to address a parent's duty of
educational support of his minor children. 0 It acknowledged the
imposition of such a duty by other states, but placed considerable
weight on the fact that the legislature of Pennsylvania, although
acting in other related capacities, has not done so itself, and opted
instead to await that action. 1" Justice Eakin adopted and applied
that reasoning in Patterson.°2 Like the issue of educational sup-
port, that of support continued from a deceased parent's estate has
gone unaddressed by the Pennsylvania Legislature." 3 As such, in
accordance with the line of reasoning developed in Blue, the ma-
jority in Patterson observed deference to a legislature that has
otherwise taken an active role in the arena of domestic relations."°
A few years later, the Pennsylvania Superior Court was called
upon to interpret the Support Act, with regard to whether its pro-
96. Id. at 1381.
97. Id.
98. 616 A.2d 628 (Pa. 1992). Blue's revelation that the legislature had not imposed
upon parents a legal duty of support related to higher education has since been superceded
by statute, as noted in Grieve v. Mankey, 660 A.2d 1367 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). Mankey
notes that "[i]n response to [Blue's] invitation, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 4327 ... which provides that a court may order parents to provide for their
children's "postsecondary educational expenses." Mankey, 600 A.2d at 1367-68.
99. Blue, 616 A.2d at 632.
100. Id. at 630.
101. Id. at 632.





vision of a child support obligation could be extended post-death. l5
The vehicle for this statutory interpretation was Garney v. Estate
of Hain,"' a case in which a woman brought an action against the
estate of her former husband to provide child support for their
three minor children."7 The issue facing the court there was
whether, under Pennsylvania law, the estate could be required to
pay child support in the absence of a court order or contractual
agreement. 8 The majority, reemphasizing the principles set forth
in Blue, held that as "the legislature has declined to impose a duty
of support on the estate of a divorced parent, and there is no case
law to be cited in support of such a duty," the court would not "leg-
islate changes in the law which our legislature has declined to
adopt.-" 9
Judge DelSole, in somewhat of a critique of societal norms,
stated that "[a]s divorce has become more prevalent ... the impor-
tance of our child support laws has increased and caused them to
undergo significant change."' ° He noted the consequent legisla-
tive trend toward enacting laws that cumulatively provided
greater assurance for the support of minor children."' Yet, while
he used this rationale to advance his opinion that the legislative
intent to continue the support obligation post-death should be in-
ferred, he also acknowledged that the legislature, while creating
all those laws, has still declined to speak on this issue.1 ' The
court thus interpreted the Act as failing to mandate a continuing
duty of support enforceable against the deceased parent's estate.1
105. Garney v. Estate of Hain, 653 A.2d 21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). The Support Act is
codified at 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4321 (1985).
106. Garney, 653 A.2d at 21.
107. Id.
108. Id. In this case, relied upon by the majority in Patterson, no support order was in
place at the time of the father's death. Id. In Patterson, although a support order already
was existing, that discrepancy was held to be an insignificant distinction. Patterson, 830
A.2d at 967.
109. Garney, 653 A.2d at 21.
110. Id. at 22 (DelSole, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 22-3 (DelSole, J., dissenting). Examples of such legislative action include 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4345(a) (2003), which provides that a parent may be held in civil
contempt, fined, and even imprisoned up to six months for willfully failing to make child
support payments; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4348, which makes the court's attachment of
the payor parent's wages routine rather than elective; and even 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
4308, which provides that any lottery winnings of the payor parent are subject to use to
fulfill support duties. Id. (DelSole, J., dissenting). 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4348 was
amended in 2003, but such amendment is immaterial to the proposition for which the stat-
ute is cited. 2003 PA H.B. 1104 (SN).
112. Id. at 23 (DelSole, J., dissenting).
113. Brief for Appellees at *4, Patterson, 830 A.2d 966 (No. 682-1999).
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Thus, while the majority of jurisdictions have held that the duty
of support ends at death, and the minority find it continuing past
that point, the issue largely remains unresolved in Pennsyl-
vania."" The legislature has failed to address it in the statutes it
has enacted, and the courts have declined to establish case law in
an area avoided by a legislature to whom they generally defer.' 5
And so the legal axiom that a father's obligation to support his
minor child does not extend to his estate but rather dies at his
death - the common law of Pennsylvania since its creation -
remains, for now, the settled state of the law."
6
Various jurisdictions have approached and argued this issue
from several different angles. Law and theory, based on contract,
estate planning, testamentary dispositions, historical develop-
ments, legislative action and stasis, and a number of other origins,
have posited a variety of theses and justifications for turning the
state of the law one way or the other. In Pennsylvania, that state
of the law presently waits at a crossroad."' It has gone quietly
unaddressed by the legislature, and has not been determinatively
mandated in case law."8 The most recent Pennsylvania case to be
witnessed and decided by the judiciary, Patterson, resulted in a
finding that the duty of child support terminates at the father's
death."9 This decision, however, seems not to have been an unfal-
tering assertion, but more a resigned resolution to defer to the leg-
islature's inaction and side with the majority of states and the es-
tablished progression of history.
Certain merit undeniably exists in the majority position, cur-
rently adopted by Patterson.2 ° The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
hesitancy to overstep its bounds and infringe on rights properly
held by the legislature is practical and even commendable in the
respect that it recognizes the scope of its own power. This premise
that deference to the legislature is an appropriate course of con-
duct is sound, but only insofar as it does not act in contravention
of progress and the purpose for which the law exists.
It is arguably the minority position, which finds the duty of
child support a continuing duty and thus enforceable against the
114. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 968-69.
115. Id. at 968.
116. Id. at 969.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 968.




deceased father's estate, that seems to be the better position in
terms of addressing the needs of the decedent's minor children,
who, by the circumstances of death, are now left, at least in part,
unsupported.
First, the law must change so as to reflect the time and circum-
stances of which it is a part. Justice Cardozo has written, "[I]n the
everyday transactions of life the average man is governed, not by
statute, but by common law, or at most by statute built upon a
substratum of common law, modifying, in details only, the com-
mon law foundation."1 22 That governing common law by which
Pennsylvania continues to abide is based on mores that have
changed since the law's inception. The prevalence of divorce and
the current practice of placing children in the custody of their
mother potentially increases the likelihood that a father will fail
to provide for his children after his death.123 This danger that once
could be brushed aside because of the historical placement of chil-
dren with their father must now become a real consideration, and
another safeguard is needed. For whereas in the 1 8 th century the
common law rule was harmless and even equitable, when juxta-
posed to present mores, its inherent danger is realized.
Justice Cardozo believed that where circumstances have
changed to such an extent that the "perpetuation of the rule would
do violence to the social conscience," that rule should likewise be
changed.124 In her dissent, Justice Newman agreed with this
proposition, stating that the common law should be adapted to
"assure that a rule previously developed is not perpetuated when
the reason for the rule no longer exists and when application of
the rule would cause injustice."25
Second, the judiciary should not await legislative action, but
create the law itself. The issue of the parameters of the duty of
child support should be looked at primarily in terms of the objec-
tive involved - the welfare of the minor children. As long as cer-
121. Id.
122. Brief for Appellants at *15, Patterson (No. 682-1999) (citing CARDozo, THE GROWTH
OF THE LAW 136-37 (Yale Univ. Press) (1924)).
123. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 972 (Newman, J., dissenting). Obviously, there is the whole
parallel issue of minor children who are in the custody of the father at the mother's death.
This author agrees that what has changed is not only divorce, but the post-divorce place-
ment of minors with the mother. If at some point in the future courts were to recognize the
equal right of the father to gain custody, this issue should be reviewed.
124. Brief for Appellants at *15, Patterson (No. 682-1999) (citing CARDOZO, THE GROWTH
OF THE LAW 136-37 (Yale Univ. Press) (1924)).
125. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 973 (citing Hack v. Hack, 433 A.2d 859, 867 (Pa. 1981)).
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tain children are not provided for at the expense of others 26 -
arguably the most viable concern of continuing the duty of support
- the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should no longer hesitate to
extend, by judicial pronouncement, the duty of support to the es-
tate of a deceased parent.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court should no longer leave the
state of the law in stasis, but rather, it should rule upon the issue
in a manner that serves the best interests of the minor children it
was designed to protect. The judiciary has a higher duty than the
legislature to assure that the purpose of the law is achieved. If
the legislative branch is negligent in doing that, the judicial
branch should not wait for the legislature to take action, but
rather, it should assume more of a leadership role. In this par-
ticular case, the judiciary should be leading the way, not waiting
for the legislature to take action.
Third, faith should be placed in the father's ability to take it
upon himself to provide for his children after his death, and he
should be allowed to do so. Where there is no viable alternative
means of supporting the child except by the deceased father's es-
tate, an overriding reason to defeat the common law rule and ex-
tend the support duty past death exists. However, an exception
should be made where the father made his minor children irrevo-
cable beneficiaries of life insurance policies, 27 created support
trusts for their benefit, or otherwise adequately provided for them
in his will. Under such circumstances, the duty should be allowed
to terminate at the father's death, especially where it appears, by
the creation of these trusts/bequests/etc., to be the intention of the
decedent that this be so. The obligation to pay support should not
transcend the right of the father as testator to dispose of his prop-
erty how and to whom he pleases, so long as his minor children
are thereby provided for. This must be determined on a case by
case basis, however, and at the court's discretion. For in situa-
tions like Patterson, where the father made only an insubstantial
bequest to his son that would not support him throughout his mi-
nority,'28 the support should continue from the estate once the
funds of the bequest have been depleted.
126. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
128. Benson, 782 A.2d at 553-54. At the time of their father's death, Stanley Jr. was
fifteen years old and Aaron was about to turn eight years old. Patterson, 830 A.2d at 966.
Patterson left cash bequests of $20,000 to Stanley Jr., and only $1,000 to Aaron. Benson,
782 A.2d at 554. In 1998, the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas had entered sup-
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While it is admirable that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
wants to delineate the scope of their power, one must consider the
possibility that they have, in fact, understated it, and that they
have a duty to assure that the laws established by practice and by
the legislature are extended to their full purpose rather than be-
ing constricted by excessive caution. It is also arguable that al-
ternative provisions for the welfare of minor children, such as
trust funds, life insurance policies, and bequests, would fully sat-
isfy the obligation of the decedent to provide for minor children
without infringement upon the estate. The courts must be careful
to recognize their duty to provide not only a voice but a vision for
the legislature. Their function is not merely to reiterate the nar-
rative of law as it is legislated, but to breathe interpretive life into
what otherwise would be a sterile and rigid document.
Gina Mercurio
port orders that required Patterson to pay $55 per week for Stanley Jr., and almost $100
per week for Aaron. Id. at 553-54. Based on this court-determined amount necessary for
Aaron's support and his young age, the amount of the bequest alone was insufficient to
provide for Aaron until he reached the age of majority.
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